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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how China’s gender imbalance could 
affect East Asian security with respect to China-Japan relations and China-
Taiwan relations.  The research result is ambiguous in that China’s excess males 
may or may not force the Chinese government to adopt a more aggressive 
foreign policy stance with Japan and Taiwan.  On the one hand, the Chinese 
government has been relatively calm in its dealings with Japan and Taiwan 
despite the rise of Chinese nationalism. The Chinese government actively 
contains anti-social behaviors associated with excess males without seriously 
affecting bilateral relations with Japan or Taiwan.  On the other hand, appealing 
to nationalistic fervor in order to strengthen regime legitimacy could force the 
Chinese government to be more belligerent.  Inaction by the Chinese 
government in response to Japanese or Taiwanese provocation could compel 
many in China to engage in mass uprising against the state, thus threatening the 
regime’s power.  This thesis also provides possible options to mitigate the social 
and political tensions presented by these excess males and to prevent potential 
regional instability.  Options such as war, public works projects, foreign marriage 
tax, population control, testosterone reduction, state-sponsored matchmaking 
service, and UN peacekeeping are explored. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, the Communist government in China enacted the controversial 
“one child” policy to address concerns of over-population and to keep the 
country’s future population growth at manageable levels.  The government was 
successful in slowing the population growth rate over the past 30 years from 1.33 
percent in 1978 to 0.51 percent in 2008; the current population is 1.3 billion.1  
However, China’s cultural preference for males perverted the One Child Policy to 
create a dangerous gender imbalance.  Estimates from both foreign and Chinese 
demographers show that there are currently between 32 million and 40 million 
more males under the age of 20 in China than females.2  In other words, these 
excess males in China will not be able to find wives in the next two decades. 
With no marriage prospects and no official outlet for their grievances, 
these excess males are increasingly an issue for the Chinese government.  Will 
this seemingly domestic matter expand into a crisis with regional security 
implications?  How dangerous are China’s excess males to Japan and Taiwan?  
Will unresolved historical grievances existing in China against Japan and Taiwan 
negatively influence these excess males?  How will China’s management of its 
excess males ultimately affect security relations between China-Japan and 
China-Taiwan?  Undoubtedly, such uncertainties create anxiety over China’s 
security positions toward Japan and Taiwan. 
Another uncertainty that could affect these excess males is the dynamic 
nature of foreign relations between these three countries.  For Sino-Japanese 
relations, Japan’s difficult and violent history with China from the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki in 1895 and continuing through the end of World War II in 1945 has 
                                            
1 “East & Southeast Asia: China,” last modified May 4, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.world-
factbook/geos/ch.html. 
2 Wei Xing Zhu, Lu Li, and Therese Hesketh. "China's excess males, sex selective abortion, 
and one child policy: analysis of data from 2005 national intercensus survey," British Medical 
Journal 338 (2009): 1, accessed April 22, 2011. doi:10.1136/bmj.b1211. 
 2 
created both numerous grievances harbored by the Chinese and a growing trend 
of nationalism.3  Similarly for China-Taiwan relations, Taiwan’s flirtations with 
formal independence and China’s declaration of forceful reunification have made 
cross-strait affairs a flashpoint for potential conflict in East Asia. 
This thesis explores how China’s gender imbalance could affect East 
Asian security with respect to China-Japan relations and China-Taiwan relations.  
The demographic literature on gender imbalance suggests that, with over 30 
million excess males of little financial means and almost no prospect for 
marriage, the potential for civil instability in China exists.  How this potential civil 
instability in China could deteriorate Sino-Japanese and cross-strait relations is a 
critical component to determining the thesis’ importance to East Asian Strategic 
Studies.  This thesis relies primarily upon qualitative methods to assess what 
influence the excess males could have on China and to determine its efficacy as 
a security threat to Taiwan and Japan.  Sources include publicly available and 
“For Official Use Only” (FOUO) primary source PRC government documents, 
scholarly books and articles, as well as relevant press reporting on the subject. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into four chapters.  In Chapter 2, 
the thesis briefly surveys the relevant literature pertinent to this topic and 
discusses the theory behind the potential dangers of China’s excess males.  The 
third and fourth chapters examine how these excess males could affect by the 
prevailing tensions in China-Japan relations and China-Taiwan relations.  These 
two chapters also extrapolate the possible security implications China’s excess 
males could have on Japan and Taiwan.  Finally, Chapter 5 offers a conclusion 
and discusses options China, Japan, and Taiwan could explore to mitigate the 
social and political tensions presented by these excess males and prevent 
potential regional instability.   
                                            
3 Kent E. Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs 85 (2006): 130. 
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II. LITERATURE AND THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to focus this thesis, this chapter surveys the relevant literature 
and discusses why excess males pose a danger.  The most obvious question 
one might ask is how will China’s excess males pose a threat to the security of 
Japan and Taiwan?  There are three established facts about China that are 
relevant to this question: 1) China has a surplus of males; 2) China has a strong 
desire to reunify with Taiwan; 3) and China has strong grievances against 
Japan.4  These three facts form the basis for the hypothesis that China’s gender 
imbalance has serious security implications for both Taiwan and Japan.  Based 
on this hypothesis, one could argue that the internal problems created by these 
excess males could overwhelm the Chinese government’s capacity to manage 
them.  Instead of suppressing these excess males, the government might enlist 
them to fight for a nationalist cause such as retaking Taiwan or exacting 
retribution on Japan.  Such a scenario, while seemingly improbable, nevertheless 
offers a starting point from which to determine the approach to the initial 
question. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature relevant to this thesis is organized into three general areas: 
demographic changes in China, China-Japan relations, and China-Taiwan 
relations.  The volume of literature written about China’s demographic issues 
nearly surpasses that written about China-Japan relations or China-Taiwan 
relations.  Two issues most often discussed are China’s “one child” policy and 
the skewed male-female sex ratio.  The “one child” policy is one of the most 
controversial population control policies enacted in China.  Simply stated, this 
                                            
4 Therese Hesketh, "Too many males in China: the causes and the consequences," 
Significance (2009): 9; Phillip K. Saunders, “Long-term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: 
Implications for U.S. Taiwan Policy,” Asian Survey 45 (2005): 973; Calder, “China and Japan’s 
Simmering Rivalry,” 130.  
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policy prohibits more than one child as a way to curb over-population.  When this 
policy is combined with China’s cultural preference for males, the results have 
dramatically altered China’s population demographics for the worse.  Zeng et al 
reported the increase in the male-female sex ratio from 1.06 before 1980 to 
1.138 in 1989.5  This report did not link the “one-child policy to the growing male-
female sex ratio imbalance, concluding only that other factors, such as under-
reporting of female births, infanticide, and child abandonment, are the likely 
cause.  Hesketh, Li, and Lu assessed the effects of the ”one-child” policy after 25 
years and concluded the policy did contribute both to a decline in fertility and to 
an increase in male-female sex ratio from 1.06 in 1979 to 1.17 in 2001.6  This 
finding was later reconfirmed by Zhu, Li, and Hesketh from China’s 2005 National 
Intercensus Survey.7  An analysis of these new data actually showed the male-
female sex ratio imbalance increasing to 1.19 by 2005.  Hesketh et al, Zhu et al, 
Coale and Banister, Poston Jr., Gupta and Li, and Liu and Zhang all agree that 
the ”one-child” policy alone could not produce such results.8  In fact, almost all 
the literature reviewed on this topic reached the same conclusion – the “one 
child” policy is only a minor contributing factor towards the male-female sex ratio 
imbalance.  The main causal mechanism for the imbalance in the male-female 
sex ratio is the availability of prenatal sex selective technology (for example, 
ultrasound), combined with the cultural preference for boys. 
                                            
5 Yi Zeng, Ping Tu, Baochang Gu , Yi Xu, Bohua Li, and Yongping Li, "Causes and 
Implications of the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio at Birth in China," Population and 
Development Review 19 (1993): 290. 
6 Therese Hesketh, Lu Li, and Wei Xing Zhu, "The Effect of China's One-Child Family Policy 
after 25 Years," New England Journal of Medicine 353 (2005): 1174. 
7 Zhu, Li, and Hesketh, "China's excess males, sex selective abortion, and one child policy: 
analysis of data from 2005 national intercensus survey," 1. 
8 Hesketh, Lu, and Zhu, "The Effect of China's One-Child Family Policy after 25 Years," 
1176; Zhu, Li, and Hesketh, "China's excess males, sex selective abortion, and one child policy: 
analysis of data from 2005 national intercensus survey;" Ansley J. Coale and Judith Banister, 
"Five Decades of Missing Females in China," Demography 31 (1994): 473; Dudley L. Poston Jr., 
"Son Preference and Fertility in China," Journal of Biosocial Science 34 (2002): 341; Monica Das 
Gupta and Shuzhuo Li, "Gender Bias in China, South Korea and India 1920-1990: Effects of War, 
Famine and Fertility Decline," Development and Change 30 (1999): 637; Tao Liu and Xing-yi 
Zhang, "Ratio of males to females in China," British Medical Journal (2009), accessed Apr 22, 
2011, http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/338/apr09_2/b483 (accessed July 17, 2010). 
 5 
The abnormally high male-female sex ratio in China has both short and 
long-term implications far greater than simply more males in the population.  
Isabelle Attane formulates several population models to investigate the future 
demographic implication of the high sex ratio in China’s population.9  Attane 
projects that by 2050, China will have a deficit in both female and male births 
(due to a shortage of reproductive-age women) compared to if China had a 
natural sex ratio of 1.06.10  However, this is just a future projection and much can 
happen between now and 2050.  Many authors argue that the short-term 
implications of the skewed sex ratio will challenge China the most.  Hudson and 
den Boer, Hesketh, Hesketh and Zhu, Edlund, Li, Yi, and Zhang, and The 
Economist all agree that the short-term implications would be possible increases 
in violence and civil unrest due to the surplus in men.11  Roughly one million 
more males are born every year than females and a great majority of these men 
will remain single and be unable to marry.  Some 70 percent of all violent crime 
offenders in China are single males between 16 and 25 years old.12  Edlund et al 
found that the crime rate in China tracks the male-female sex ratio imbalance – 
every 0.01 increase in male-female sex ratio increases violent crimes by 3 
percent.13  All of these authors speculate that it is only a matter of time before 
these single men disrupt the civil stability of China. 
The literature reviewed makes no clear association between Chinese 
gender imbalance and security implications for Taiwan and Japan, which would 
                                            
9 Isabelle Attane, "The Demographic Impact of a Female Deficit in China, 2000-2050," 
Population and Development Review 32 (2006): 763. 
10 Ibid., 769. 
11 Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea den Boer, "A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace," 
International Security 26 (2002): 22; Hesketh, "Too many males in China: the causes and the 
consequences," 12; Therese Hesketh and Wei Xing Zhu, "Abnormal Sex Ratios in Human 
Populations: Causes and Consequences," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States of America 103 (2006): 13274; Lena Edlund, Hongbin Li, Junjian Yi, and 
Junsen Zhang, “Sex Ratios and Crime: Evidence from China's One-Child Policy” (Discussion 
Paper No. 3214, IZA, 2008); "The Worldwide War On Baby Girls," The Economist (March 6–12, 
2010): 78. 
12 Hudson and den Boer, “A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace,” 32. 
13 Edlund, Li, Yi, and Zhang, “Sex Ratios and Crime: Evidence from China's One-Child 
Policy.” 
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suggest a critical gap on this topic.  Hudson and den Boer attempt to make the 
association by implying that these excess males could affect regional security as 
China seeks ways to employ them for national causes.  Hudson and den Boer do 
not go into any detail regarding what this employment of surplus males would 
entail, nor do they speculate on how it would affect Taiwan and Japan.  In order 
to expand further on Hudson and den Boer’s hypothesis, this literature review 
shifts focus to China-Japan relations and China-Taiwan relations. 
The relations between China and Japan are mired in historical, strategic, 
and economic complications.  According to Kent Calder, China considers Japan 
as an economic partner, a peer rival, and a historical belligerent.14  Japan 
External Trade Organization reported that Japan’s total trade with China (imports 
and exports combined) exceeded U.S.$300 billion in 2011, making China 
Japan’s largest trading partner and Japan China’s third largest trading partner.15  
Both China and Japan are competing for the same energy resources needed to 
fuel their economies.  Since Japan depends exclusively on imports for all of its 
energy needs, China sees Japan as a direct competitor for the same energy 
resources.  Unfortunately, this competition feeds into China’s historical 
grievances with Japan.  Many in China view any action by the Japanese with 
suspicion and fear due to Japan’s historic treatment of China.  According to 
Calder, nationalist sentiments fuel this negative view of the Japanese and hinder 
efforts at cooperation.16 
The prevalence of anti-Japanese sentiments has forced the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to reconsider its ability to control the population for the 
good of national interest.  Gries notes that much of this anti-Japanese sentiment 
developed from “internet nationalism,” which is more capable of converting 
                                            
14 Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry,” 131. 
15 “Japan-China Trade in 2010 Exceeds US$300 Billion to Set New Record,” last modified 
May 12, 2011, http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/20110512035-news. 
16 Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry,” 133. 
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popular opinion into political action than traditional forms of activism.17  This, 
argues Gries, puts the CCP in a very difficult position: a stable relationship with 
Japan is crucial to ensuring China’s continued economic growth, but cooperating 
with the Japanese will make the CCP appear weak in the eyes of strident 
nationalists and undermine the party’s legitimacy.18  China-Japan relations will 
hinge on China’s ability to balance the co-existence of cooperation and conflict 
with Tokyo.19  
Cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan present similar 
complications as the relationship between China and Japan.  Some authors have 
said that cross-strait relations have improved because of deepening economic 
ties.  Taiwan’s massive investments in China since the early 1980s were a major 
driver for China’s economic growth.  Sutter states that in nearly 50 percent of 
Taiwan’s outbound foreign direct investments (over U.S.$100 billion) were 
invested in China in 2000, and the trend was predicted to increase in the 
future.20  The Economist noted that nearly 40 percent of all exports from Taiwan 
go to China.21  This level of economic integration and interdependence (as Sutter 
and The Economist reason) will lead to more stability across the Taiwan Strait, 
prolonging the status quo. 
Nevertheless, other authors have indicated that cross-strait tensions are 
destined to escalate in the future.  China still considers reintegrating Taiwan a 
top priority, and the easing of cross-straits tensions will have little influence on 
China’s decision to use force to reintegrate Taiwan.  Philip Saunders argues that 
                                            
17 Peter Hays Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking’ on Japan,” The China Quarterly 184 (2005): 
848. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 850. 
20 Karen M. Sutter, “Business Dynamism across the Taiwan Strait: The Implications for 
Cross-Strait Relations,” Asian Survey 42 (2002): 528. 





Taiwan’s economic dependence on China represents a strategic shortfall that 
Taiwan’s government has not been able to address.22  Taiwan’s increasing 
dependence on cross-strait trade could bode well for China, creating a situation 
where China could resort to economic threats to force Taiwan to accept 
reunification.23  In addition, some authors note that Taiwan’s increasing sense of 
a separate national identity has already caused tensions with China.24  This 
nationalism in Taiwan could further the cause for the island’s independence and 
accelerate China’s decision to force reunification.25 
Many scholars have questioned China’s ability to invade Taiwan.  Tsang 
points out the uncertainty concerning China’s cost-benefit analysis of a war with 
Taiwan and suggests how the results will constrain the decision-making 
process.26  One factor that China must consider is the diplomatic cost associated 
with attacking Taiwan.  Deng argues that China risks sabotaging its strategic goal 
of creating a peaceful international environment, and force regional states to 
mobilize hostile containment.27  Another factor that China must consider is the 
economic cost of attacking Taiwan.  Huang asserts that the economic damage 
would not be localized to just China and Taiwan; the Asia-Pacific region’s 
economies will also be damaged due to the high degree of economic 
interdependence with China.28  Lastly, the political costs associated with 
attacking Taiwan will be: 1) condemnation and isolation in international politics if 
                                            
22 Saunders, “Long-term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: Implications for U.S. Taiwan 
Policy,” 984. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Kenneth Lieberthal, “Preventing a War over Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs 84 (2005): 59; T. Y. 
Wang and I-Chou Liu, “Contending Identities in Taiwan: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations,” 
Asian Survey 44 (2004): 568. 
25 Lieberthal, “Preventing a War over Taiwan,” 60. 
26 Steve Tsang, “Drivers Behind the Use of Force,” in If China Attacks Taiwan: Military, 
strategy, politics and economics, ed. Steve Tsang (New York: Routledge, 2006), 13. 
27 Yong Deng, “Diplomatic Consequences,” in If China Attacks Taiwan: Military, strategy, 
politics and economics, ed. Steve Tsang (New York: Routledge, 2006), 189. 
28 Jing Huang, “Economic and Political Costs,” in If China Attacks Taiwan: Military, strategy, 
politics and economics, ed. Steve Tsang (New York: Routledge, 2006), 197. 
 9 
China won; and 2) the collapse of the communist regime if China lost.29  As 
these authors implied, China’s decision to attack Taiwan will not be easy given 
the multitude of factors and considerations that will affect the outcome of the war. 
C. WHY AN EXCESS OF MALES IS DETRIMENTAL FOR CHINA 
In order to fill this critical gap concerning the security implications of 
China’s excess males, more consideration is needed of why such a problem is 
important.  In Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male 
Population, Hudson and den Boer conclude that China’s excess males have the 
potential to incite social upheaval that could threaten stability and the Chinese 
Communist Party’s rule in China.30  Because of the shortage of women resulting 
from the combination of China’s “one child” policy and a cultural preference for 
males, it has become more difficult for men in China to find suitable marriage 
partners.  The inability of these men to find wives has created a sizeable 
population of permanent bachelors.  According to Hudson and den Boer, these 
young males all share similar characteristics and behavioral tendencies that 
make them an issue in highly imbalanced sex-ratio societies like China. 
These excess males share many characteristics that distinguish them 
from the other subsections of the China’s population.  The first characteristic 
these excess males share is that they tend to be the most socioeconomically 
disadvantaged of all males in China.31  They are predominantly poorly educated 
and are from areas of China that suffer from a high sex-ratio imbalance.  Unlike 
men with better socio-economic backgrounds, these males cannot compete 
effectively in the marriage market and thus frequently end up alone.  Secondly, 
they are often underemployed or unemployed with few resources to make them 
more viable for marriage.32  They are also more likely to be chosen for low-status 
                                            
29 Ibid., 203. 
30 Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s 
Surplus Male Population (London: The MIT Press, 2005): 258. 
31 Ibid., 188. 
32 Ibid., 189. 
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jobs that are dangerous and/or labor-intensive.33  The practice of hypergyny 
(marrying someone of a higher socioeconomic status) compounds the problem 
by further reducing the number of available women for these excess males.  
Third, these excess males are most likely transients poorly regarded in the 
community and considered social outcasts.34  There is a higher probability that 
these men might engage in criminal activities because of the high degree of 
anonymity they enjoy.  Due to growing crime rates and overtaxed urban 
infrastructure, many urban Chinese harbor fear and resentment toward these 
transients.  Lastly, they tend to surround themselves with other single, young 
males that share the same predicament and disposition.35  This has the negative 
effect of amplifying their grievances and further enhancing their isolation from 
normal society.  
Not only do these males share characteristics that set them apart from 
others in society, they are also encumbered with high-risk behavioral tendencies 
that are inextricably linked with being male.  First, males are more aggressive 
and violent than females.36  Independent of their location and prevailing culture, 
men usually commit violent crimes.  Second, males are more likely to be 
engaged in anti-social behavior.37  For example, nearly 79 percent of violent 
crimes committed by lone offenders in the United States are males.38  Third, 
unmarried males perpetrate more violent crimes than married males of the same 
age group.39  The basis for this behavioral tendency is the theory that single men 
have higher levels of testosterone than married men do, and that testosterone 
                                            
33 David T. Courtwright, Violent Land: Single Men and Social Disorder from the Frontier to 
the Inner City (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 188. 
34 Hudson and den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male 
Population, 190. 
35 Ibid., 191. 
36 Ibid., 192. 
37 Ibid., 193. 
38 “Offender Demographics,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, accessed September 11, 2011, 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=942. 
39 Hudson and den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male 
Population, 194. 
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contributes to antisocial behavior.40  Recent studies have shown that for similar 
aged men, married men with children have considerably lower levels of 
testosterone than single men do.41  Fourth, males of lower socioeconomic 
standing commit more violence than males of a higher socioeconomic 
standing.42  Scientists Margo Wilson and Martin Daly discovered that 
unemployed males are four times more likely to commit murder than employed 
males.43  Fifth, males under the influence of drugs and alcohol commit more 
violence than males who are clean and sober.44  Wilson and Daly found that 
young unmarried males abuse alcohol and drugs more than married males, older 
males, or females.45  Sixth, transient males both commit and suffer more violent 
crimes than non-transient males in a given population.46  During 1997, migrants 
accounted for 90 percent of crimes committed in Shanghai’s Pudong region.47  
Lastly, group dynamics tend to exaggerate high-risk behavior among males, 
especially those who are young, unmarried, poor, and/or substance abusing.48  
Males in group situations condone, even encourage, risky behavior as a means 
to elevate their social prestige.  Often the group behavior will not rise above the 
behavior of the worst behaved individual, and they will take more risks than they 
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47 Ren Meng, “Confronting Three Populations of 80 Million,” Inside China Mainland 19 
(January 1997): 79. 
48 Hudson and den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male 
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would if they acted alone.  Given these characteristics and behavioral 
tendencies, excess males are a potential destabilizing force that will likely 
increase crime and violence in China. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Both the relevant literature and the potential detrimental effects of excess 
males present a disconnected assessment of future security relations for China, 
Japan, and Taiwan.  On the one hand, the possible destabilizing effects of 
China’s excess males could derail China’s march towards global preeminence.  
On the other hand, many authors argue that China-Japan relations and China-
Taiwan relations could be the pivotal factors in determining the security of all 
three countries.  The difficulty now is drawing the connections between what is 
relevant (Sino-Japanese and Cross-Strait relations) to what is seemingly 
irrelevant (China’s excess males) to China-Japan-Taiwan security relations.  The 
next two chapters will propose the causal linkages that might connect these two 
unrelated factors and explain how China’s excess males could affect the security 
of Japan and Taiwan. 
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III. EXCESS MALES AND CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The concerns about China’s excess males affecting Japan’s national 
security would initially seem misplaced.  Many security experts would opine that 
threats such as a North Korean nuclear attack or the fracturing of the American 
security alliance would pose a greater risk to Japan’s national security than a 
large gang of unmarried Chinese men.  While few would dispute that a nuclear-
armed North Korea poses an existential security threat to Japan, the 
contentiousness of China’s excess males as a security threat to Japan deserves 
further examination.  In Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s 
Surplus Male Population, authors Hudson and den Boer offer a cursory 
explanation that high sex-ratio societies create greater regional instability without 
discussing the mechanisms that would bring about this instability.  This chapter 
will provide further elaboration on Hudson and den Boer’s premise by discussing 
how the dynamics of Sino-Japanese relations could enable excess males to 
create instability. 
B. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 
Historically, relations between Japan and China were well defined in that 
one country was always more prosperous or powerful than the other.  China’s 
dominance in the region extended up through the mid-nineteenth century; 
Japan’s preeminence in the region started from the Meiji Restoration in 1868.  
Noted scholar Kent E. Calder observed that it was only recently the prospect 
emerged of China and Japan both being powerful and affluent at the same time, 
largely because Japan’s economy has remained stagnant while China’s 
economy and influence have grown rapidly.49  China possesses nuclear 
weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and has experienced double-digit 
                                            
49 Kent E. Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs 85 (March/April 
2006): 129. 
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growth rates in its military budget for the last 20 years.  Japan has a military 
profile that is relatively lower than China’s military profile.  However, Japan’s 
military capability is more advanced with its sophisticated defense-relevant 
technology and strong alliance with the United States.  Even though Japan’s 
constitution has restricted the military to mainly defensive capabilities, it has 
recently become more proactive regional and global multinational military 
operations. 
The dynamic and complex nature of Sino-Japanese relations creates 
inherent contradictions.  After 39 years of normalized relations, the economies of 
China and Japan are interdependent.  China displaced the United States to 
become Japan’s top trade partner accounting for U.S.$149B in exports and 
U.S.$152B in imports by the end of 2010.50  Japan is China’s third largest trading 
partner after the European Union and the United States.51  Many economic 
experts forecast trade between both countries to improve steadily from current 
levels as China’s domestic consumption increases in the coming years. 
Unfortunately, buoyant trade and close economic linkages between the 
two countries might be the few positive aspects of their relationship remaining.  
Many Chinese citizens harbor deep resentment toward Japan based largely on 
historical grievances.  Chinese grievances against Japan could be trace back to 
the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895 that resulted in the ceding of Taiwan to 
Japan.  The war atrocities committed by Japan against China throughout the 
1930s until the end of World War II remain as a vivid reminder of Japan’s 
savagery.  Even as Japan quickly divested its militant past after World War 2, 
Japan’s actions throughout the years reinforce a perceived lack of sensitivity or 
remorse for its wrongdoing on the Chinese.  Over the last eight years, many 
incidents involving the Japanese have only increased Chinese hatred of them.  
Since 2003, these incidents include: 
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1. In August 2003, a group of Chinese workers at a construction site in Qiqihar 
(Heilongjiang Province) unearthed five decayed drums, including one that 
contained mustard gas.  The gas killed one man and injured 43 others. 52  
The gas was undisposed chemical weapons left behind in China at the end of 
World War II by the retreating Japanese military. 
2. In September 2003, Chinese police in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province detained 
six individuals connected to a sex orgy involving 400 Japanese tourists and 
around 500 local Chinese prostitutes.53  The incident took place on 
September 16–18, which coincided with the Mukden Incident of 1931 that 
began Japan’s occupation of Manchuria.  Many Chinese expressed their rage 
and anger over this incident online, citing that these Japanese men engaged 
in this sex orgy to “humiliate China on what the Chinese already called their 
national day of humiliation, September 18.”54 
3. Japan’s approval of school textbooks that some critics say simplified wartime 
atrocities, such as the rape of thousands of "comfort women" used as sex 
slaves by the Japanese military. 55  As a result, violent anti-Japanese 
demonstrations erupted throughout several cities in China.  Demonstrators 
vandalized the Japanese embassy in Beijing, and looted and destroyed 
suspected Japanese-owned businesses. 
4. Multiple visits to Yasakuni shrine (a Shinto shrine for Japan’s war dead) by 
then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.  Since the war dead at the 
shrine also includes World War Two Class A war criminals, Koizumi’s visits 
garnered condemnation and protest from the Chinese because they felt this 
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was “paying homage” to the war criminals and “valorizing their cruelties 
toward China.”56 
5. In February 2005, the United States and Japan issued a joint security 
statement declaring a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan Strait issue to be 
among their common strategic objectives for the region.  This drew harsh 
criticism from the Chinese government.  Chinese citizens quickly took to the 
streets to vent their anger and protest against what they interpreted as Japan 
interfering in the internal affairs of China.  Some feared this joint security 
statement indicated Japan’s hidden intentions to renew an invasion of 
China.57 
6. In September 2010, disputes over territorial waters and the ownership of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands escalated when a Chinese boat captain was 
detained by the Japanese Coast Guard after his fishing boat collided with two 
Japanese Coast Guard vessels.58  Many Chinese citizens protested in front of 
Japanese diplomatic missions and schools in China for the release of the 
boat captain and China’s claim over the disputed islands.  The Chinese 
government suspended ministerial-level contacts with Japan, and many 
Chinese tour organizers and their clients canceled scheduled trips to Japan 
as a sign of solidarity with the government.  Coincidentally, Chinese custom 
officials halted exports of rare earth metals crucial to Japan’s high-technology 
industry.  Some see this as a retaliatory measure against the Japanese for 
detaining the Chinese boat captain.59  Japan freed the boat captain a few 
weeks after the collision incident. 
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Conversely, China also drew the ire of Japan during this same period.  
Some of the incidents include: 
1. In 2003, three Chinese nationals studying in Japan robbed and brutally 
murdered a Japanese family of four in the southern city of Fukuoka.60  The 
killings shocked Japan, and when it was learned that the chief suspects were 
Chinese, media coverage became frenzied.  As a result, many Japanese 
citizens feel that Chinese and other foreigners are largely responsible for the 
rising crime rate in Japan.  However, crime statistics show that nearly all 
crimes committed (97 percent) in Japan are perpetrated by Japanese 
citizens.61  Two of the suspects were apprehended and tried in China; one 
received the death penalty and the other received a life sentence.  The third 
suspect was apprehended in Japan, tried, and is currently on death row. 
2. In 2004, seven Chinese activists landed on a small disputed islet of Uotsuri-
shima and claimed it as part of Chinese territory.  During the ten hours on the 
islet, the activists planted a Chinese flag and gave remote interviews to 
Chinese media.  These seven activists were later detained by Japanese 
police and charged with violating Japanese immigration laws.  The police later 
stated that one of the detainees had been arrested previously in Japan for 
vandalizing the Yasakuni Shrine after then-Prime Minister Koizumi’s first 
controversial visit in August 2001.62 
3. Again, in 2004, a Chinese submarine entered Japanese territorial waters in 
the southwestern sector of Okinawa prefecture, about 400 kilometers from 
Okinawa.63  The incursion lasted less than two hours, and caused the 
Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) to go on alert for the second 
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time since World War 2.  JMSDF tracked and pursued the submarine with a 
P-3C Orion aircraft and two JMSDF cruisers until it left Japanese waters.  
China denied Japan’s accusations that the submarine was testing JMSDF 
capabilities at the fringes of Japan’s territorial boundary. 
4. Some Chinese scholars are beginning to claim Okinawa as a part of China in 
numerous Chinese academic journals.  These scholars argue that 
sovereignty over Okinawa is disputed because the Qing Emperor Guangxu 
objected when Japan abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom and established 
Okinawa prefecture in 1879.  These scholars assert that the abolition of the 
Ryukyu Kingdom by the Meiji government in 1879, American control over 
Okinawa after post-World War II, and Okinawa’s reversion to Japanese 
sovereignty in 1972 were all illegitimate, which affirmed China’s right to claim 
Okinawa.64  Many recent anti-Japanese protesters in China have taken to 
demand the liberation of Okinawa from Japan and the restoration of the 
Ryukyu Kingdom. 
C. THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS ON 
CHINA’S EXCESS MALES 
Chinese attitudes toward the Japanese are closely correlated with the 
state of Sino-Japanese relations at any given time.  When the relationship is 
perceived to be good, the latent anti-Japanese sentiment is mostly confined to 
internet chat rooms and blogs.  Anti-Japanese sentiment is demonstrated 
publicly when Sino-Japanese relations are perceived to be bad, and can quickly 
escalate into violence as illustrated by recent protests.  Either way, the 
underlying anti-Japanese sentiments harbored by many Chinese could create the 
necessary conditions for China’s excess males to incite civil unrest. 
Anti-Japanese protests could be the most probable way for China’s 
excess males to organize in sufficient numbers.  Protesting will appeal to China’s 
excess males because it provides a forum in which to vent their frustration at 
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someone or something.  The underlying issues that trouble these males might 
not necessarily be anti-Japanese in nature, such as being poor, under-educated, 
under-represented, and/or unable to find wives.65  These issues manifest as anti-
Japanese sentiment because these males might incorrectly assume that their 
current predicament is the result of Japanese misdeeds in China’s past.  There 
could be an escalation to violence because of the behavior tendencies of these 
excess males—single males of low socioeconomic status have higher tendencies 
toward violence and group dynamics tend to exaggerate high-risk behavior 
among males.66  As the protest prolongs without resolution, these males might 
resort to violence as a means to garner more attention to the situation.  This 
could get out of hand quickly because the group’s behavior does not rise above 
the behavior of the worst behaved male.67 
In order for the latent anti-Japanese sentiment among China’s excess 
males to explode violently onto the streets, an event or situation needs to occur 
to spark this mass uprising.  While it would be hard to predict what situation 
would spark mass anti-Japanese uprising in China, a common characteristic that 
will be shared among these situations is Chinese nationalist indignation against 
Japanese disrespect and humiliation.  Nine possible events would provide the 
potential spark; some will be very similar to those mentioned in the previous 
sections.   
Incident #1: Any situation that involves a Chinese national arrested or 
detained by Japanese police in connection with the assertion of Chinese 
sovereignty over a disputed territory would likely create violent anti-Japanese 
protests.  A likely scenario would be a group of Chinese nationals infiltrating the 
Senkaku Islands and reclaiming Chinese sovereignty.  The Japanese police 
would eventually arrest these Chinese nationals, and the Chinese government 
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would demand their unconditional release.  Many Chinese citizens in China 
would protest against Japan for what they perceive as Japanese subjugation.  As 
mentioned early, anti-Japanese protests were organized throughout China in 
response to the detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain who collided into two 
Japanese Coast Guard ships near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.68   
Incident #2: Any situation that involves Japan downplaying its role in the 
war atrocities committed in China during the second Sino-Japanese War.  One 
likely scenario would be Japanese officials approving history textbooks that 
contain passages that lessen Japan’s involvement in China during the war years.  
Another likely scenario would be a Japanese politician or government official 
publically stating that these war atrocities were exaggerated or just plain 
fabrications.  The Chinese government would demand that Japan rewrite those 
textbook passages to reflect accurately Japan’s involvement.  They would also 
demand the offending Japanese politician or government official to be censured 
for his/her comments.  In both scenarios, Chinese citizens would protest against 
what they see as Japan’s surreptitious attempt to revise history and absolve 
themselves of their crimes. 
Incident #3: Any situation that involves a Chinese national being seriously 
injured or killed by a Japanese national.  The reason behind why a Chinese 
national was injured or killed is immaterial because Chinese citizens would only 
see Japanese aggression against the Chinese.  If the crime occurred in Japan, 
the Chinese government would demand immediate resolution to the case.  If the 
crime occurred in China, the Chinese government would ensure the case was 
immediately resolved at the detriment of due process.  In both cases, Chinese 
citizens would protest against this crime and against what they perceived as the 
reemergence of Japanese aggression. 
Incident #4: Any situation where Japanese politicians and/or government 
officials comment on Taiwan’s sovereign status in relation to Japanese politics.  
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A likely scenario would be an influential member of the Diet publically stating that 
Taiwan is a core interest to Japan’s national security, and that Japan would 
ensure such core interests would be protected.  Chinese citizens would protest 
against what they perceive as Japan’s meddling in China’s internal affairs.  They 
might also think that Japan was trying to reassert sovereignty over Taiwan, an 
island the Japanese once colonized from 1895 to 1945. 
Incident #5: Any situation that involves a Japanese national sports team 
competing against a Chinese national sports team in China.  The result of the 
game or match would be inconsequential because Chinese citizens would still 
protest against the Japanese.  If China won, celebration and jubilation could 
quickly devolve into violence because of latent anti-Japanese sentiments.69  If 
China lost, violent protests would be the likely outcome as demonstrated in the 
violent riots by Chinese citizens after Japan’s victory over China in the 2004 
Asian Cup final.70 
Incident #6: Any situation that involves a Chinese national being seriously 
harmed or killed by a product made by a Japanese company.  The location from 
where the harmful product was manufactured is not important, even though the 
product in question is most likely manufactured in China.  The Chinese 
government would launch an investigation and demand compensation for the 
victim.  Chinese citizens would boycott the Japanese company and protest 
against what they believe to be Japan’s historical disregard for Chinese life.71 
Incident #7: Any situation that involves Japan successfully gaining a 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.  Japan contributes 
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generously to the United Nation’s operating budget (about 20 percent annually), 
and has sought a permanent seat since 1960s.72  Chinese citizens have 
protested against Japan’s recent bid for a permanent seat because Japan has 
yet to apologize for the atrocities committed by Japanese Imperial troops in 
China.73  If Japan’s bid is successful, Chinese citizens would protest with 
increased fervor.  However, Japan is unlikely to win a bid because of the Chinese 
government’s insistence on blocking Japan’s bid.74 
Incident #8: Any situation that involves Japan Self-Defense Force 
operating close to Chinese territorial boundaries and eliciting a direct challenge 
from the People’s Liberation Army.  For example, the USNS Impeccable incident 
in the South China Sea during March 2009 briefly strained relations between the 
United States and China.75  This incident also indicated China’s growing military 
confidence in the region as it challenges the United States.  No public protests 
against the United States were held in China.  However, a similar incident 
involving the Japanese would likely result in mass protest across China under the 
perception that Japan is disrespecting China’s territorial sovereignty. 
Incident #9: Any situation that involves Japanese politicians and/or 
government officials visiting the Yasakuni Shrine in Tokyo.  Multiple visits to the 
Yasakuni Shrine during Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s time in office elicited 
strong condemnation from the Chinese government and popular protest 
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throughout China.76  A similar visit by any Japanese official would provoke the 
same response in China, even potentially escalating peaceful demonstrations to 
violent ones. 
D. ARE CHINA’S EXCESS MALES REALLY A DIRECT SECURITY 
THREAT TO JAPAN? 
It is ambiguous whether China’s excess males are really a direct security 
threat to Japan.  On the one hand, the answer to this question is no.  Despite 
evidence showing single males are more predisposed to violence and the fragility 
of Sino-Japanese relations, these excess males are not a direct threat to 
Japanese national security.  There is no evidence that China’s 30 million or so 
excess males are capable of mounting a direct assault on Japan.  Some of the 
aforementioned protests did escalate to violence, but the violence was localized 
to China without spreading to Japan.  Sino-Japanese relations since the 1950s 
have not deteriorated enough to implore China to use military force against 
Japan.  Much of the vitriol the two countries aimed at one another has been on 
the diplomatic side of this rivalry.  The Chinese government has been effective in 
managing popular anti-Japanese sentiment and protests across China using the 
People’s Armed Police.  Even if the Chinese government fails in containing future 
anti-Japanese protests and violent unrest ensues, China’s excess males 
essentially become a threat mitigator for Japan’s national security.  China would 
be too distracted with terminating the violent unrest that the focus on Japan 
would be shifted away temporarily.   
On the other hand, China’s excess males could be an indirect threat to 
Japan.  There is an underlying concern as to how much longer the Chinese 
government will continue to contain this anti-Japanese sentiment.  The 
proliferation of mobile communication technology means that it will be 
increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to contain public dissent.  In 
China, the internet has become a haven for anti-Japanese rhetoric that is 
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frequently militant in tone and intent.  Additionally, the internet also provides an 
effective means to organize anti-Japanese protests through social media 
websites and discussion forums.  The real security threat is the increased 
uncertainty of how the Chinese government will respond to the actions of these 
excess males.  If the Chinese government escapes widespread civil unrest by 
appealing to these excess males and hardening its rhetoric against Japan, Sino-
Japanese relations could take a violent turn.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The state of Sino-Japanese relations will be the primary factor determining 
the level of indirect threat China’s excess males pose to Japan’s national 
security.  The key to popular anti-Japanese sentiment in China is the perception 
that Japan has not fully apologized and atoned for its wartime actions.  The 
longer Japan chooses to ignore this issue, the greater the intensity of anti-
Japanese sentiments in created.  This also increases the likelihood of violence 
incited by China’s excess males.  Worsening relations between the China and 
Japan could be either dangerous or advantageous to Japan depending on 
China’s management of its excess males.  Japan’s national security is 
threatened if China collaborates with its excess males, whereas Japan’s national 
security is safe if China is preoccupied with containing widespread civil unrest.  
Improving relations between the two countries could provide opportunities for 
Japan to positively engage and solve China’s excess male problem.  In either 
case, Japan can ensure minimal national security threat from China’s excess 
males by being less antagonistic in its relations with China.   
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IV. EXCESS MALES AND CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The relations between China and Taiwan have oscillated between relative 
peace and potential war since 1945 without sufficient resolution that satisfies 
both countries’ governments.  To many security experts, this situation between 
the two countries has created the most dangerous flashpoint in northeast Asia.  
While there are a few issues that could ignite a cross-strait conflict, the issue of 
how China’s excess males could affect Taiwan’s national security deserves 
further investigation.  As with the previous discussion on China-Japan relations, 
this chapter will provide further elaboration on Hudson and den Boer’s premise 
by discussing how the dynamics of China-Taiwan relations could enable excess 
males to create instability. 
B. CURRENT STATE OF CHINA-TAIWAN AFFAIRS 
The interests of the ruling regimes in both China and Taiwan have 
transformed since 1949 into largely incompatible objectives.  China insists upon 
recovery of the island of Taiwan which it asserts is a part of China’s sovereignty, 
cut from the mainland first by the Japanese and then by the KMT.  Taiwan 
initially believed that reunification with China would be the ultimate end state, 
although this belief has wavered since full democracy.  More recently, Taiwan 
has sought increasing autonomy and international space despite China’s 
objections, with the majority of the population favoring a status quo of neither 
formal independence nor Chinese control. 
Both China and Taiwan have taken steps to build better relations across 
the Strait.  China’s reunification rhetoric quieted in 2005 when the CCP regarded 
Taiwan “less as an ideologically charged and urgent matter and more as a 
pragmatic and low-key management issue.”77  Since then, China has made more 
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concessions to Taiwan by allowing greater participation in multilateral 
international organization like the World Health Organization and limited 
presence in the United Nations.  Ma Ying-jeou’s presidential victory in 2008 
reversed much of the damage created by Chen Shui-bian and the DPP.  
President Ma promised the Taiwanese public and China that he would not seek 
unification, independence, or conflict.78  Shortly after Ma’s promise, cross-strait 
talks resumed and agreements were made to enhance economic ties.  Both 
sides agreed to allow 270 direct flights per week across the strait to enhance 
tourism and commerce by eliminating intermediate points like Hong Kong, Japan, 
and South Korea.  Chinese and Taiwanese leadership no longer feared the 
specter of greater economic integration as a means to dissipate political power. 
Many see China and Taiwan’s economic entanglement as having clear 
and immediate political benefits.  As Taiwan’s industrial manufacturing and 
commercial sales become increasingly intertwined with Chinese production 
capabilities, China believes that Taiwan’s businessmen will both resist 
interruption of ties and pressure Taipei for closer political relations to gain 
benefits and protection.  Large numbers of Taiwanese already live and work in 
China where they are subject to China’s influence.  The creation of business 
alliances between China’s and Taiwan’s commercial interests favors China as it 
did with Hong Kong commercial interests.  In Hong Kong, this arrangement 
proved crucial to easing the British handover and to subsequent implementation 
of China’s model of “one country, two systems.”79  China’s leadership views 
these connections as a logical mechanism for peacefully resolving the cross-
strait impasse.   
Unfortunately, continuing American arms sales to Taiwan has renewed 
cross-strait tensions.  Most recently in 2010, the Obama administration approved 
the sale of PAC-3 missile defense systems, Black Hawk utility helicopters, 
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Harpoon anti-ship training missiles, C2 communications equipment, and Osprey-
class minehunters for an estimated value of U.S.$6 billion; the decision on the 
sale of F-16C/D fighters is still pending.80  China’s leadership protested the arms 
sales stating that it was a violation of China’s internal affairs and it could 
destabilize any positive gains made by China and Taiwan in the past few 
years.81  The United States has maintained that the sale was in accordance with 
the Taiwan Relations Act that legally obligates the availability of weapons for 
Taiwan’s defense. 
C. THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS ON 
CHINA’S EXCESS MALES 
The effects of cross-strait relations on China’s excess males are not 
entirely clear.  On the one hand, China-Taiwan relations could have no effect on 
these excess males.  As discussed in the previous section, the Chinese public’s 
sentiment towards Japan is unanimously negative.  One can see a direct 
correlation between worsening Sino-Japanese relations and increases in anti-
Japanese protest.  China’s excess males could use such protests as a means to 
broadcast their grievances.  However, anti-Taiwan sentiment is mainly harbored 
by the state and not by the Chinese public.  Actions such as the missile exercises 
off the coast of Taiwan leading up to the 1996 Taiwanese Presidential elections 
and the threat of military action against the island if independence is declared are 
state initiated with no influence from the public.  Any public protest in China 
against Taiwan would need to be manufactured by the CCP and sustained by 
both the PLA and the state’s propaganda apparatus.  Even though these excess 
males are generally poorly educated, they might see through the CCP’s hollow 
attempts to elicit support for China’s Taiwan policy. 
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On the other hand, worsening cross-strait relations and the CCP’s rhetoric 
against Taiwan could incite China’s excess males to protest.  Attitudes toward 
Taiwan are closely shaped by the prevailing views held by the CCP.  Since the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the CCP’s irredentist 
claim to Taiwan stems from a broader national discourse of humiliation and 
weakness.  While the Taiwanese government of recent years has been cautious 
not to add to this national discourse, the Taiwanese public is less inhibited in 
expressing its views against China and China’s confrontational posture towards 
Taiwanese sovereignty and self-determination.82  China’s excess males could 
see the defiance exhibited by the Taiwanese public as furthering China’s 
humiliation and weakness.  Reclaiming Taiwan could be seen by these excess 
males as the ultimate end state to make everything right for themselves and 
China.  Knowing that the consequences for failing are potentially regime-
threaten, the CCP is striving to reintegrate Taiwan into China in order to avert 
domestic nationalist backlash and a crisis of regime legitimacy. 
Lately, many have questioned the relevancy of nationalism in China’s 
Taiwan policy.  Taiwan, by virtue of its geographic location, represents a potential 
strategic threat to China.  It could serve as a forward operating base for foreign 
military operations against China.  Even in peacetime, foreign influence over 
Taiwan could constrain China’s ability to develop and project naval power and 
ensure maritime security in East Asia.  The CCP would need to propagandize 
this potential existential threat in order to provoke China’s excess males to 
support a more belligerent policy towards Taiwan. 
Taiwan needs to initiate a provocative event or situation in order to push 
the CCP into action and cultivate enough anti-Taiwan sentiment among China’s 
excess males.  Based on cross-strait dynamics of the past 20 years, a clear 
provocation to China would be Taiwan moving towards independence or 
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enhancing its capability to declare independence.  Listed below are six possible 
events that would ignite a firestorm of protest and violent conflict involving 
China’s excess males. 
Incident #1: Taiwan declares independence.  Almost all China observers 
agree that such a scenario would result in immediate armed conflict between 
China and Taiwan.  Taiwan could declare independence two different ways: 1) 
the president could declare it unilaterally, or 2) the people overwhelmingly vote 
for independence.  China could try to coerce Taiwan into reaccepting the status 
quo, but that could prove risky to the CCP if Taiwan remains defiant.  In order for 
the regime not to lose face, the CCP could conclude that a swift military response 
against Taiwan would be the only course of action for China as codified in Article 
8 of the March 14, 2005 Anti-Secession Law.83  The CCP’s propaganda 
apparatus could stoke up support for military action against Taiwan with 
nationalistic sentiments and a steady diatribe against the Taiwanese separatists.  
Since the CCP has closely linked the loss of Taiwan to China’s century-long 
humiliation at the hands of imperialist foreigners, mass protests could erupt 
throughout China to support forcefully reclaiming sovereign territory and the 
reestablishment of national dignity.  The vast majority of the protesters could be 
excess males because their behavioral tendencies and characteristics would 
draw them to such gatherings.  The presence of these excess males would 
dramatically increase the likelihood of the protests turning violent.  Even if the 
CCP has no intention of going to war with Taiwan, the likely turmoil created by 
the excess males because of CCP inaction could force an invasion of Taiwan in 
order to appease the masses. 
Incident #2: Taiwan develops a nuclear weapon.  Like declaring 
independence, this scenario could also result in a swift response from China.  In 
this situation, the CCP could feel compelled to initiate a preemptive strike to 
remove the threat before Taiwan has the opportunity to use it against China.  The 
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CCP would need to make the public see that Taiwanese separatists are 
threatening China’s survival.  The idea of a preemptive strike could garner 
overwhelming public support for the CCP in China.  The CCP could push for a 
preemptive strike by focusing on claims that the Taiwanese separatists are 
readying themselves for an attack on the mainland.  They could argue that the 
nuclear weapon would reverse the course of China’s economic and social 
progress and kill thousands of innocent civilians.  Another argument the CCP 
could also put forward is the claim that putting down these Taiwanese separatists 
is of grave importance to China’s national security.  Since separatist influences 
have infiltrated all levels of the Taiwanese government, it is imperative that these 
influences be purged before reintegrating Taiwan into China.  Lastly, the CCP 
could argue that China needs to make a stand with Taiwan, as in Xinjiang and 
Tibet, to protect its territorial integrity or risk the nation further humiliation and 
shame.  Protests against Taiwan could spring up across China as nationalism 
takes hold among the Chinese people.  The government could be urged by the 
public to take immediate action to eliminate this nuclear threat.  The likelihood of 
excess males inciting violence at these protests increases as the government 
prolongs inaction. 
Incident #3: A military accident between the two countries occurs in the 
Taiwan Strait.  China has been more aggressive in enforcing its territorial 
integrity as its military capability has increased in the past twenty years.  This has 
meant pushing beyond the bounds of China’s territorial waters and extending into 
its economic exclusion zone.  With both countries’ maritime boundaries in such 
close proximity to each other, China’s aggressive patrols could lead to a military 
incident with Taiwanese patrols.  This incident could escalate into a full-scale 
military conflict before both sides have the chance to investigate the incident 
thoroughly.  Fearing that a soft response could damage the regime’s power in 
China, the CCP could order the military to mobilize for war.  The CCP’s 
propaganda apparatus could spin this situation in China’s favor by placing the 
blame on Taiwan and its antagonistic military.  Seeing no other option, the 
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Taiwanese would counter by mobilizing its military to repel against a possible 
invasion.  There might be calls for third-party mediation to deescalate cross-strait 
tensions, but the momentum of the situation may be too great to slow or stop.  
People on both sides of the strait could stage mass protests about what they see 
as a clear provocation for war by the other side.  Unfortunately for China, this 
situation is more perilous because of its excess male population.  If these excess 
males perceive that the government is not taking decisive action against Taiwan, 
their protesting might turn violent and disrupt civil order in China. 
Incident #4: An increase in Chinese females marrying Taiwanese males, 
thus further reducing the pool of available women in China.  Taiwan is also 
experiencing its own issues with gender imbalance.  Factors such as declining 
birth rates, cultural preference for boys, and different mortality rates have created 
a society where men significantly outnumber women.  This has created a strain 
on the availability of women in Taiwan’s marriage market.  Typically in Taiwan, 
men seek a woman who is two to four years younger as the ideal marriage 
partner.84  Such a practice places downward pressure on the pool of younger 
women in Taiwan while creating an increase in the number of single women 
above the age of 30.85  Traditionally in Taiwanese culture, the unspoken 
marriage deadline for women is often considered 30 years of age.86  This 
distortion in the marriage market has resulted in increasing numbers of inter-
ethnic marriages between Taiwanese males and Asian brides, especially ones 
from China.  If cross-strait relations sour and China no longer wants to maintain 
the status quo, the CCP’s propaganda arm could cast Taiwan as the villain with 
respect to the outflow of Chinese brides to Taiwan.  Because of negative 
coverage created by state-controlled media and the anxieties generated, China’s 
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excess males could perceive these Taiwanese males are exacerbating the 
gender imbalance problem by taking away eligible Chinese women.  This 
resentment could manifest itself into popular protest against Taiwan, which could 
prompt the CCP to take action in order to reaffirm its power in China. 
Incident #5: A group of Chinese tourists are injured or killed in Taiwan.  
After Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, he quickly permitted 
Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan.  Fewer than 200,000 Chinese tourists in tour 
groups visited Taiwan the first year, but the numbers have steadily increased 
each year to over 1.63 million in 2010.87  The move to allow individual tourists to 
visit from China starting in 2012 is expected to double the number of Chinese 
tourists to 4 million and generate an additional U.S.$4.59 billion to Taiwan’s 
GDP.88  Such an influx of Chinese cash and tourists could prove too tempting to 
ignore for criminals in Taiwan.  An incident similar to the Qiandao Lake Incident 
in 1994 that killed 24 Taiwanese tourists in China’s Zhejiang Province could 
weaken cross-strait relations and potentially escalate tensions.89  With the 
Qiandao Lake Incident, Chinese officials initially gave false information stating 
that no foul play had occurred but retracted the statement nearly three weeks 
later by admitting the tourists were murdered by bandits.  These officials also 
refused to transfer the bodies to Taiwan, choosing instead to order the bodies 
cremated without concurrence from the relatives of the deceased or Taiwanese 
officials.90  Many people in Taiwan interpreted these actions as an indication of a 
cover-up by the Chinese government and protested accordingly.  If Taiwanese 
officials mishandle the situation in the same manner as Chinese officials did in 
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1994, an anti-Taiwan backlash could occur.  Many in China (including excess 
males) could protest against what they perceive as a conspiracy against China 
and demand the government to take immediate action.  As in the previous 
incidents, inaction on the CCP could escalate the protests to violence. 
Incident #6: A delegation of Chinese government officials are seriously 
injured or killed by a mob of angry protesters in Taiwan.  Anti-China protests 
staged by pro-independence supporters have become more frequent since 
President Ma took office in 2008.  Most of the protestors are sympathetic to the 
DPP’s rhetoric and feel that the closer ties President Ma is pushing to create with 
China are dangerous for Taiwan.  Even though the protests have been largely 
peaceful, there have been occasions where anti-China fervor has manifested into 
a more violent form.  In October of 2008, Zhang Mingqing, vice president of 
China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), was 
physically assaulted by pro-independence protestors while visiting a temple in 
the southern Taiwanese city of Tainan.91  While Mr. Zhang’s injuries from the 
attack were minor, the incident does underscore the volatility of anti-China 
sentiments in Taiwan.  As more Chinese officials make visits to Taiwan while 
cross-strait relations are improving, anti-China sentiments harbored by DPP 
supporters could harden and become extreme.  Incidents similar to what Mr. 
Zhang experienced could increase and make the Taiwanese government more 
on edge.  These hostile encounters could escalate into deadly violence against 
the visiting Chinese officials if the ruling party in Taiwan does not address the 
protesters’ concerns about China.  Because the CCP might interpret such 
violence as a provocation against China, cross-strait tensions and anti-Taiwan 
sentiments in China could immediately heighten.  This condition could fuel mass 
protests across China urging the government to take action against Taiwan. 
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D. ARE CHINA’S EXCESS MALES REALLY A DIRECT SECURITY 
THREAT TO TAIWAN? 
Similar to the case with Japan, it is uncertain whether China’s excess 
males are really a security threat to Taiwan.  On the one hand, the answer to this 
question is no.  China’s excess males are not a direct threat to Taiwan’s national 
security despite the contrary evidence of excess male behavioral tendencies and 
the tenuousness of cross-strait relations.  The CCP has not taken any military 
action against Taiwan since 1996 when the PLA fired missiles at Taiwan to 
prevent the island’s first-ever presidential election.  Cross-strait relations have 
improved significantly since 2008 when President Ma of the KMT took office.  
There have not been any mass anti-Taiwan demonstrations in China, although 
anti-China protests in Taiwan have been a common occurrence for the past few 
years.  Taiwan and China are both economically intertwined, with Taiwanese 
firms employing millions of Chinese citizens in China.  To most Chinese citizens, 
the people of Taiwan are considered their brothers and sisters because of 
similarities in culture and language.  The Chinese could reason that attacking 
Taiwan would be akin to attacking one’s own family.  Based on this logic, China’s 
excess males could see little reason to advocate violence.  These excess males 
could even draw the logical conclusion that closer cross-strait ties could 
eventually increase the number of available women in the marriage market.  
Even if the CCP succeeds in using nationalism to create regime support and anti-
Taiwan protests ensue, China’s excess males could essentially reduce the threat 
to Taiwan’s national security by distracting the government.  The CCP would 
focus massive resources and energy to contain these excess males and stop the 
violence from destabilizing civil order. 
On the other hand, China’s excess males could be an indirect threat to 
Taiwan.  Since Mao’s death in the late 1970s, the CCP has relied on economic 
growth and nationalism to sustain the regime’s survival.  One aspect of the 
nationalism the CCP continues to instill in its people is the idea that China’s 
greatness will not be achieved until it unifies with Taiwan.  The CCP would 
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certainly fight to avoid the loss of Taiwan because so much of the regime’s 
legitimacy is fused with this issue.92  The Chinese people would expect the 
regime to do everything in its power to prevent Taiwan from becoming 
independent.  People in China (mainly the excess males) would most likely hold 
anti-Taiwan demonstrations to show support for swift action to reclaim Taiwan if 
independence is declared.  These excess males would incite mass civil unrest 
throughout the country if the CCP took no action against Taiwan.  Given that this 
possibility would weigh heavily on the CCP’s decision-making, the regime would 
have no choice but to attack Taiwan in order to stave off civil chaos in China.  
Unfortunately, attacking Taiwan would only offer the CCP a brief respite before 
the next decisive moment: whether China wins or loses the war.  Winning the war 
would realize China’s national goal of unification with Taiwan and cement the 
CCP’s legitimacy with the Chinese people.  Losing the war would almost certainly 
propel these excess males to violent upheaval and bring the collapse of the 
CCP.93  While there are many factors to consider if China could win a war 
against Taiwan, the possibility of losing and its likely devastating aftermath would 
force the CCP to ensure regime survival by waging Clausewitzian total war and 
winning Taiwan at all cost. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The primary factor determining the indirect threat China’s excess males 
pose to Taiwan’s national security will be the relationship China and Taiwan have 
with each other.  The CCP’s legitimacy is intricately intertwined with preventing 
Taiwan’s independence.  Since the regime used nationalistic sentiments to 
influence public attitudes towards Taiwan, a backlash against the CCP could 
result if the actions taken against Taiwan are deemed insufficient by the Chinese 
people (especially the excess males).  Because of this fear and the need to 
suppress public outrage, the CCP would undoubtedly use swift military force to 
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incapacitate the island if Taiwan’s government makes a formal declaration of 
independence.  Conversely, Taiwan could be safe from Chinese retaliation 
because the CCP might be too preoccupied containing widespread civil unrest 
caused by excess males.  The current trend of improving relations between the 
two countries could provide opportunities for Taiwan to positively engage and 
solve China’s excess male problem.  By helping China with its excess male 
problem, Taiwan could prevent the problem from threatening its security and the 
status quo. 
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V. CONCLUSION: EXCESS MALES MITIGATION OPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With over 30 million excess males, China’s gender imbalance is quickly 
becoming a dire security risk to China.  Hudson and den Boer hinted that China 
could face critical internal challenges because of the detrimental behavioral 
tendencies these excess males possess.  What are uncertain are the challenges 
these excess males could present beyond the borders of China.  This thesis has 
researched the possible implications China’s excess males could have on Sino-
Japanese and cross-Strait security relations.  While there could be many these 
males, this author argues that the main factor is China’s foreign relations with 
Japan and Taiwan. 
The challenges excess males might present to Sino-Japanese relations 
and Cross-Strait relations are ones that China, Japan, and Taiwan need not 
stand idle and let such situations dictate the terms.  While it is uncertain if such 
scenarios could produce catastrophic results, China, Japan, and Taiwan could 
preemptively engage these excess males to limit the violent destruction hinted in 
the previous two chapters.  Preemptive engagement could also stem the 
potentially destabilizing effects that civil unrest could have on the region.  
Whether the engagement method is violent or non-violent, all three countries 
need to understand that the state of their relationship will determine how these 
excess males will react.  This chapter will present a small sampling of preemptive 
options that these three countries could explore in order to limit or mitigate the 
devastating potential of China’s excess males.  All of the options presented in 
this section are interchangeable between the three countries and could be 
implemented concurrently to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
In order to focus the discussion better on how China, Japan, and Taiwan 
should engage each other with respect to the issue of excess males, a few 
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assumptions are needed for both Sino-Japanese relations and China-Taiwan 
relations.  For relations between China and Japan, the first assumption is that 
China and Japan will never reach a diplomatic solution to permanently improving 
relations between them; the best their relationship will achieve is vacillating 
between being serviceable and being disastrous.  The second assumption is that 
both countries want to avoid war; China does not want to draw the United States 
into the conflict, while Japan does not want to risk destroying its struggling 
economy.  The last assumption is that the Chinese government will not risk 
upsetting regime legitimacy and stability in order to prevent war between China 
and Japan. 
For cross-strait relations, the first assumption is that Taiwan wants to 
maintain the current status quo with China.  The reasoning behind this 
assumption is two-fold: 1) announcing formal independence would certainly 
provoke a violent response from China, while 2) reunifying with China could undo 
many of the social and personal freedoms the Taiwanese currently enjoy.  The 
second assumption is that both countries want to avoid war.  A cross-strait war 
could cripple the economies of both China and Taiwan because of the high level 
of economic interdependence.  For Taiwan, the United States’ ambiguous 
commitment to defend the island could make war with China too perilous to 
pursue.  For China, war with Taiwan might mean the collapse of the CCP 
regardless of the outcome.94 
How China, Japan, and Taiwan arrive at a specific state in their 
relationship is beyond the scope of this discussion; what is of interest is how to 
engage these excess males with respect to a specific state of the China-Japan or 
China-Taiwan relationship. 
C. MITIGATING OPTIONS FOR CHINA, JAPAN, AND TAIWAN 
The most obvious way to improve relations and stabilize regional security 
would be for Japan and Taiwan to stop antagonizing China.  As simple as this 
                                            
94 Huang, “Economic and Political Costs,” in If China Attacks Taiwan, ed. Steve Tsang, 203. 
 39 
solution may seem, the complexity of their relationships can turn innocent 
gestures into international incidents.  Any actions that China could interpret as 
pro-independence by Taiwan or anti-Chinese by Japan are liable for intense 
scrutiny, criticism, and retaliation.95  Outbursts of nationalist indignation and 
protest could further complicate the situation for parties.  This may lead many 
people to wonder if wounds from the past can be healed. 
1. War 
If relations between China, Japan, and Taiwan cannot be salvaged, war 
could be the most logical method of preempting China’s excess males.  In the 
book Bare Branches, Hudson and den Boer write that societies in the past 
pursued war as a way of dealing with the issue of excess males.96  For example, 
early 16th Century Portugal had an estimated sex ratio of 112 males to 100 
females.97  In order to distract these legions of excess males from destabilizing 
the Portuguese monarchy, the king ordered a military expansionary campaign 
along Africa’s north coast.  Hudson and den Boer estimated that the military 
campaign was successful in killing 25 percent of all Portuguese males, thereby 
reducing the overall number of males existing in Portugal.98  They suggest that 
China might suffer the same fate if the country does not rectify the issue and the 
associated societal impact.  According to the diversionary war theory, China 
could manufacture an armed conflict to deal with the domestic problem of excess 
males.99  A conflict with Japan over the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands or with Taiwan 
over pro-independence overtures is plausible if China looks to placate the 
masses and cull its excess males.  However effective war might be at reducing 
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the number of excess males in society, China should not start a conflict with 
Japan or Taiwan to justify recalibrating its skewed sex ratio back to natural 
levels.  The destructive nature of such an endeavor would inevitably extend 
beyond the waters around the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands or the Taiwan Strait; 
locations in China, Japan, and Taiwan would likely be potential targets.  There 
would be a high probability that scores of women would be killed as collateral 
damage because of the military operations conducted in Chinese urban areas, 
thus further exacerbating the imbalanced sex ratios in China.   
2. Public Works 
Conversely, if relations between the three countries are serviceable, 
Japan and Taiwan could seek collaboration with China in order to maintain 
cordial bilateral relations and to solve the issue of excess males.  One 
collaborative option Japan and Taiwan could pursue with China is commissioning 
massive public works projects that utilize Chinese males as laborers.  Such 
projects could provide ample employment opportunities and constructive 
distractions for these excess males.  For example, the Three Gorges Dam 
project employed an estimated 250,000 workers throughout the 17 years needed 
to complete the dam.100  Another equally large public works project was the 
Qinghai-Tibet Railway, which employed over 100,000 workers during its five-year 
construction.101  One possible project that Japan and Taiwan might commission 
would be a shipping canal that cuts across the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand.  
The benefits of this canal would be shorten transits between the Indian Ocean 
and South China Sea and bypassing the pirate dangers of the Strait of Malacca.  
Such a project could employ as many as 100,000 Chinese workers to build the 
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canal.102  While working in Thailand, these Chinese excess males could 
potentially find suitable Thai females to wed and take back to China. 
3. Population Control 
Another collaborative option Japan and Taiwan can pursue with China is 
developing a population control program that artificially selects for female 
offspring.  This program would be a modification of the existing One Child Policy: 
married couples in China would be either financially rewarded for female 
offspring or fined for male offspring.  Japan and Taiwan can be responsible for 
funding the program and providing the financial rewards to married parents who 
comply with the program’s parameters.  China can be responsible for 
administering the program, enforcing the program rules, and collecting the fines.  
There is precedence for such a scheme in Asia; Singapore has a program that 
pays married couples to have children as a means to combat low birth rates.  
Called the Child Development Co-Savings (Baby Bonus) Scheme, married 
Singaporean citizens can receive a cash gift up to U.S.$3300 each for their first 
and second child and U.S.$5000 each for their third and fourth child.103  The 
Singaporean government will also make dollar-for-dollar matching contribution for 
the amount the parents save in their child’s Child Development Account.  While 
the fundamental problem in China is different from that of Singapore’s population 
problem, the incentives structure in Singapore’s Baby Bonus scheme could be 
adapted by Japan, Taiwan, and China to achieve the desired results. 
Additionally, this collaborative program would have a limited duration of 
five years.  In 2009, China reported that the total number of live births in the 
previous year was about 18,134,000.104  The sex ratio for these births was 113 
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males to every 100 females.105  By selecting against males, the number of 
female births would increase with respect to male births.  There would still be 
some male births because some parents are able and willing to pay the fines.  
Over the program’s five-year lifespan, one can expect the total number of live 
births to decrease.  For illustrative purposes, total number of live births 
decreases to about 12 million per year because of the effectiveness of the 
program.  One can expect the number of female births to increase above the 
normal annual female birth rate because girls that would have been aborted or 
abandoned as a cultural consequence of male-preference under the One Child 
Policy would now survive.  A 20 percent increase in female births would result in 
about 10 million baby girls per year.  By the end of the program, China would 
have enough females to rebalance the skewed sex ratio to natural levels. 
4. Foreign Marriage Tax  
China, Japan, and Taiwan could devise a marriage tax that targets foreign 
men and discourages them from marrying women in China and exacerbating the 
excess male problem.  Men from Japan and Taiwan who intent to marry a 
Chinese national must pay a nonrefundable foreign marriage authorization fee to 
their respective countries.  Once these Japanese or Taiwanese men (or any 
foreign men) are in China, they must comply with Chinese tax regulations for 
foreign marriage.  Foreign males who meet a two-year residency requirement 
and want to marry Chinese females in China must pay a marriage tax that is 
equivalent to five-times the male’s annual foreign salary.  Those who do not meet 
the residency requirement must pay a marriage tax that is equivalent to ten times 
the man’s annual salary.  An additional clause would tax couples the equivalent 
of five-times their combined annual income if they divorce within three years of 
marriage could further discourage foreign marriage.   
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Because of this marriage tax scheme, the Chinese government could 
portray themselves as virtuous protectors of Chinese women and ardent 
supporters of the excess males.  They could claim the tax scheme is designed to 
limit cultural pollution from foreign influences, which could be used to align the 
government with nationalistic forces to forge greater regime legitimacy.  In 
addition, the revenue generated by all three countries from this marriage tax 
scheme could be used to offset the cost of social programs designed to help 
China’s excess males.   
Despite the instant appeal, the success of such a marriage tax would be 
marginal.  In absolute terms, foreign marriages in China have negligible impact 
on the pool of available Chinese women.  The number of foreign marriages 
represents a very small percentage of the total number of marriages each year in 
China; for instance, foreign marriages represent only 2,236 of the 128,532 total 
marriages registered in Shanghai in 2010.106  The minute increase in the number 
of available women because of this foreign marriage tax would do little to ease 
the excess male problem.  Some might argue that these women are less likely to 
marry an excess male because their preference was to marry a foreigner.  
Others might argue that the vast majority of China’s excess males possess 
neither the wealth nor the social status of a foreigner, therefore less likely to 
attract these women.  If both arguments are correct, a foreign marriage tax would 
provide no relief for China’s excess male problem. 
5. State-Sponsored Matchmaking 
Japan and Taiwan could also develop a state-sponsored matchmaking 
service that would strive to find suitable mates for China’s excess males.  This 
service could base its operating procedures on Singapore’s state-sponsored 
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matchmaking service.107  While Singapore’s service provides an effective 
template from which China, Japan, and Taiwan can build their service, 
modifications such as abolishing the requirements for both parties to have at 
least a college degree or minimum annual salaries would need to be made in 
order to meet China’s objectives of placating excess males. 
Funded by a partnership between China, Japan, and Taiwan, this state-
sponsored matchmaking service could be made available only to men in China 
who fit the target characteristics of excess males: 1) single, 2) between the ages 
of 20 and 45, 3) no higher than a high school equivalent education, and 4) an 
annual income lower than the national average.108  China could utilize its 
diplomatic and economic influences throughout the region to enable its 
matchmaking service’s ability to look for potential mates.  Many Asian countries 
could benefit handsomely from friendlier diplomatic and economic relations with 
China.  Southeast Asian countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, 
Myanmar, Indonesia, and Laos could provide this program with a source of 
ethnically compatible single women.  The practice of outsourcing mates from 
Southeast Asian countries is performed by single men in Taiwan and Hong Kong 
because of higher degrees of financial independence and the dwindling pool of 
age-appropriate single local females in those two areas.109   
Unfortunately, the number of excess males in Taiwan and Hong Kong are 
many orders of magnitude smaller than the number in China.  Authors Hudson 
and den Boer’s demographic calculations suggest that China will have about 29–
33 million excess males aged 15–34 by 2020.110  This number is the biggest 
impediment to the success of the proposed matchmaking program.  A question 
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the program creators would need to answer is whether Southeast Asia can 
provide sufficient numbers of single females to satisfy the demand from China’s 
excess males.  A preliminary calculation based on the population numbers and 
sex ratios of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Indonesia 
suggests that there are only about 1.7 million excess females, which is 17–19 
times smaller than the number of excess males in China.111  Even if all of these 
excess females were successfully paired with an excess male counterpart from 
China, China would still possess an overwhelming sex imbalance problem.  
Broadening the search for single females beyond Southeast Asia could increase 
the pool of available women for the matchmaking program.  This approach could 
present many cultural and racial issues that even the most desperate of China’s 
excess males might not be willing to compromise.  Conversely, single women 
from areas outside of Southeast Asia might have similar apprehensions about 
marrying these excess males.  While this matchmaking program could provide 
monetary compensation to both parties as a way to bridge any cultural and racial 
divide, the social stigma of marrying someone who is not Chinese (or even 
Asian) could be too much of a barrier for these excess males. 
6. Testosterone Reduction 
Given that a state-sponsored matchmaking service might not be feasible 
because of the sheer numbers of excess males in China, a different approach 
would be needed.  A better option for China, Japan, and Taiwan might be to co-
develop a program that decreases the overall levels of testosterone in China’s 
excess male population instead of trying to find wives for them.  Many scientific 
studies have shown a causal link between high testosterone levels and 
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aggression.112  By reducing the overall testosterone levels in China’s excess 
males, the corresponding decrease in aggressive behavior could mitigate the 
chances of a violent uprising against the CCP. 
As with the state-sponsored matchmaking service proposed above, 
Japan, Taiwan, and China could fund this “pacification” program that exclusively 
targets these excess males.  This program could adopt a two-pronged approach 
to reducing the levels of testosterone: 1) castrate imprisoned males and 2) 
administer estrogen hormones to non-imprisoned males on a voluntary basis.  
Targeting imprisoned men would be a logical choice to reduce the number of 
excess males for the first part of the program.  According to the International 
Centre for Prison Studies at the University of Essex, China has an estimated 
1.65 million incarcerated men.113  Even though these men only account for about 
five percent of the excess males, their criminal actions make them a threat to 
society and the government.  Mandatory castration of prisoners would reduce 
testosterone levels among these men, serve as punishment for crimes 
committed, and act as a deterrent for criminal activities. 
The second prong of the program could be an initiative that voluntarily 
castrates excess males in exchange for monetary compensation and benefits.  
The program would focus its efforts on the excess male population between the 
ages of 20 and 45, but it could be potentially opened to all single men in China.  
For the duration of their contract, these volunteers would agree to a form of 
chemical castration that lowers their testosterone levels.  Prostate cancer 
medication such as luteinizing hormone-releasing hormone (LH-RH) agonists 
that prevent the testicles from receiving signals to make testosterone could be 
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administered regularly to these volunteers until they reach fifty years old.114  
Studies have shown that this medication can achieve levels of testosterone 
similar to those achieved with orchiectomy (removal of the testicles).115  In order 
to compensate for the potential side effects of chemical castration, a monetary 
compensation could be paid along with state-provided medical care.  The 
Chinese government could levy heavy fines or even impose prison sentences for 
volunteers who violated or prematurely terminates their contracts. 
However, some people might interpret the implementation of this 
“pacification” program as a clear violation of human rights.  They could argue that 
denying China’s excess males the opportunity to procreate and live life as a 
whole person contravenes the basic nature of being human.  While such appeals 
might garner support and sympathy among Western human rights activists, 
China would likely ignore the international outcry about its human rights abuses 
and continue with the program.  The success of this “pacification” program would 
be of great importance to the future of China, Japan, and Taiwan and the survival 
of the CCP. 
7. UN Peacekeeping 
Instead of trying to reduce the levels of testosterone in China’s excess 
males, another option would be to harness this aggression for a global good.  
China, with assistance from Japan and Taiwan, could develop a security force 
comprised solely of its excess males.  This security force would be funded by 
Japan and Taiwan and assigned to the United Nations as a permanent military 
force.  Commanded by a permanent member nation in the United Nation Security 
Council such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, or Russia, this 
security force could be permanent replacements for UN peacekeeping forces 
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throughout the world.  China’s excess males would volunteer to join the security 
force and commit to five years of service.  The size of the security force could be 
as large as 300,000 if only 1 percent of the estimated 30 million excess males in 
China serve.116  They could receive 20–25 percent higher salaries than the 
average People’s Liberation Army recruit in order to attract greater participation 
and retention. 
This collaboration would be advantageous for all parties.  The United 
Nations gets greater legitimacy as an arbitrator of peace and stability.  Japan 
gets greater involvement in international security without committing its military 
forces or violating Article Nine of its constitution.  Taiwan gets greater 
international identity and visibility without antagonizing China.  China gets greater 
international recognition as a responsible power by providing the manpower to 
put towards world peace; it also gets gainful employment of its excess males.  
There is a potential that the number of excess males would be reduced because 
of the security force operating in hostile areas.  While the loss of lives would be 
regrettable, China would ultimately see this development as an acceptable 
means to rid itself of a social problem. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis research yields three conclusions.  First, these excess males 
may have a significant impact on the stability of China’s foreign relations with 
Japan and Taiwan.  Serviceable relations will maintain the status quo and 
minimize agitation.  If relations worsen, nationalistic sentiments in China will 
provoke extreme responses from these excess males.  Since these males 
possess greater aggressive and violent tendencies, anti-Japanese and anti-
Taiwan protests in China would quickly escalate into chaos.  Secondly, China’s 
excess males are an indirect threat to the national security of Japan and Taiwan.  
In an attempt to pacify the possible mass civil unrest created by these excess 
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males, Beijing could pursue military measures against Japan and Taiwan to 
ensure regime survival.  The purpose would be to divert these males’ attention 
away from the CCP and onto a common enemy who is either perpetuating 
historical grievances or advocating formal independence.  Lastly, these excess 
males trap China between two bad choices.  On the one hand, choosing inaction 
against Japan or Taiwan would doom China to widespread social unrest and 
possible regime collapse.  On the other hand, choosing military action against 
Japan or Taiwan could lead to defeat, in which case regime collapse is highly 
likely.  It would be imperative that China wages total war to increase the 
probability of victory.  However, the potential cost of this victory could be 
economically and politically devastating to Japan, Taiwan, and China.   
Despite the gloomy forecast for China-Japan and China-Taiwan security 
relations, China’s excess males do present an opportunity for greater regional 
cooperation.  Japanese and Taiwanese collaboration with China could mitigate 
the problem, improve Japan and Taiwan’s public image with the Chinese public, 
strengthen bilateral relations, and enhance regional stability.  The preemptive 
options presented above to mitigate the potentially devastating effects of China’s 
excess males represent a small sampling of the possible courses of action.  The 
interchangeability of the options gives China, Japan, and Taiwan flexibility in 
implementing mitigation programs that satisfies all parties.  While war might 
seem like the most logical option to reduce the number of China’s excess males, 
the potential destruction could render any gained benefit useless to the 
participants.  The other options are not without issues, but they are beneficial for 
the entire region by offering a more positive approach.  The success of this 
collaboration will depend on how determined each country is to solve this excess 
male problem.  Japan and Taiwan can ill-afford to standby and be idle when 
engaging China’s excess male problem could improve relations with China and 
create lasting stability.   
 50 
While some might object to the engagement methods suggested, this author 
believes that a certain degree of moral ambiguity is necessary to manage 
China’s excess males aggressively, efficiently, and effectively. 
 51 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
About Social Development Network. June 14, 2011. 
http://www.lovebyte.org.sg/web/host_p_1main.asp (accessed October 2, 
2011). 
Archer, John. "Testosterone and human aggression: an evaluation of the 
challenge hypothesis." Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Review 30 
(2006): 319-345. 
Attane, Isabelle. "The Demographic Impact of a Female Deficit in China, 2000-
2050." Population and Development Review 32, no. 4 (2006): 755-770. 
BBC News. Chinese riot after Japan victory. August 7, 2004. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3541380.stm (accessed August 7, 
2011). 
BBC News. Japan family murderers sentenced. January 25, 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4201167.stm (accessed August 2, 
2011). 
BBC News. Koizumi shrine visit stokes anger. August 15, 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4789905.stm (accessed August 14, 2011). 
Brawer, Michael K. "Challenges with Luteinizing Hormone-Releasing Hormone 
Agonists: Flare and Surge." Reviews in Urology 6 (2004): S12-S18. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. Offender Demographics. 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=942 (accessed September 11, 
2011). 
Calder, Kent E. "China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry." Foreign Affairs (Council 
on Foreign Relations) 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 129-139. 
Chang, Mina. "Tipping the Scale: Gender Imbalance in China." Harvard 
International Review 30, no. 1 (2008): 10-11. 
Chinese official attacked by pro-independence activists in Taiwan. October 21, 
2008. 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/384278/1/.h
tml (accessed September 28, 2011). 
 52 
Central Intelligence Agency. East & Southeast Asia: China. May 4, 2011. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html 
(accessed May 7, 2011). 
Central Intelligence Agency. Sex Ratio. August 7, 2011. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2018.html 
(accessed August 15, 2011). 
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. October 2, 2011. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html 
(accessed October 2, 2011). 
Coale, Ansley J., and Judith Banister. "Five Decades of Missing Females in 
China." Demography 31, no. 3 (August 1994): 459-479.  
Coulmas, Florian. "Japan's Bid for a Permanent Seat on the UN Security 
Council." ASIEN 100 (July 2006): 18-22. 
Courtwright, David T., Violent Land: Single Men and Social Disorder from the 
Frontier to the Inner City. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. 
Curtin, J. Sean. Japan murder fuels false anti-China furor. November 13, 2004. 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FK13Dh01.html (accessed August 2, 
2011). 
Curtin, J. Sean. New Sino-Japanese strain over disputed islands. March 27, 
2004. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FC27Dh01.html (accessed 
August 2, 2011). 
Curtin, J. Sean. Submarine puts Japan-China ties into a dive. October 17, 2004. 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FK17Dh01.html (accessed August 2, 
2011). 
Deng, Yong. "Diplomatic Consequences." In If China Attacks Taiwan: Military, 
strategy, politics and economics, edited by Steve Tsang, 179-192. New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 
Dooren, Jennifer Corbett. Men Biologically Wired to Be Nurturing Fathers. 
September 13, 2011. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190353280457656694306
0360516.html (accessed September 13, 2011). 
Dreyer, June Teufel. "Sino-Japanese Rivalry and Its Implications for Developing 
Nations." Asian Survey 46, no. 4 (July/August 2006): 538-557. 
 53 
Dumbaugh, Kerry. "Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices." 
U.S. Congressional Research Service. no. RL33510. December 14, 2007. 
Edlund, Lena, Hongbin Li, Junjian Yi, and Junsen Zhang. Sex Ratios and Crime: 
Evidence from China's One-Child Policy. Discussion Paper No. 3214, IZA, 
2008. 
European Commission. China. March 25, 2011. 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/countries/china/ (accessed August 1, 2011). 
Fincher, Leta Hong. China Against Japan Getting a Permanent Seat on UN 
Security Council. April 13, 2005. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-
13-2005-04-13-voa3-66920632.html (accessed August 1, 2011). 
Finkelstein, Jordan W., and et al. "Estrogen or Testosterone Increases Self-
Reported Aggressive Behaviors in Hypogonadal Adolescents." The 
Journal of Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism 82, no. 8 (1997): 2433-
2438. 
Flacker, Martin, and Ian Johnson. Japan Retreats With Release of Chinese Boat 
Captain. September 24, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/world/asia/25chinajapan.html 
(accessed August 2, 2011). 
French, Howard W. China Allows More Protests in Shanghai Against Japan. April 
17, 2005. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/17/international/asia/17china.html 
(accessed August 7, 2011). 
Gilley, Bruce. "Not So Dire Straits." Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (January/February 
2010): 44-60. 
Gries, Peter Hays. "China's "New Thinking" on Japan." The China Quarterly 
(Cambridge University Press) 184 (December 2005): 831-850. 
Gupta, Monica Das, and Shuzhuo Li. "Gender Bias in China, South Korea and 
India 1920-1990: Effects of War, Famine and Fertility Decline." 
Development and Change 30 (1999): 619-652. 
He, Yinan. "History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese 
Conflict." Journal of Contemporary China 50, no. 16 (February 2007): 1-
24. 
 54 
Hesketh, Therese. "Too many males in China: the causes and the 
consequences." Significance, March 2009: 9-13. 
Hesketh, Therese, Lu Li, and Wei Xing Zhu. "The Effect of China's One-Child 
Family Policy after 25 Years." New England Journal of Medicine 353, no. 
11 (2005): 1171-1176. 
Hesketh, Therese, and Wei Xing Zhu. "Abnormal Sex Ratios in Human 
Populations: Causes and Consequences." Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103, no. 36 
(September 2006): 13271-13275. 
Huang, Jing. "Economic and Political Costs." In If China Attacks Taiwan: Military, 
strategy, politics and economics, edited by Steve Tsang, 193-206. New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 
Hudson, Valerie M., and Andrea den Boer. "A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of 
Peace." International Security 26, no. 4 (2002): 5-38. 
———. Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male 
Population. London: The MIT Press, 2005. 
Japan External Trade Organization. Japan-China Trade in 2010 Exceeds 
US$300 Billion to Set New Record. May 12, 2011. 
http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/20110512035-news (accessed 
May 14, 2011). 
Japan External Trade Organization. Japanese Trade and Statistics. July 25, 
2011. http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/ (accessed August 1, 
2011). 
Kahn, Joseph. Chinese Angered by Reported Orgy Involving Japanese Tourists. 
September 30, 2003. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/30/world/china-
angered-by-reported-orgy-involving-japanese-
tourists.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (accessed August 2, 2011). 
Kan, Shirley A. "Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990." U.S. Congressional 
Research Service. no. RL30957. August 2, 2011. 
Kennedy, Bruce. China's Three Gorges Dam. n.d. 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/asian.superpower/three.gor
ges/ (accessed August 16, 2011). 
 55 
Largerkvist, Johan. "The Rise of Online Public Opinion in the People's Republic 
of China." China: An International Journal 3, no. 1 (March 2005): 119-130. 
Lieberthal, Kenneth. "Preventing a War over Taiwan." Foreign Affairs (Council on 
Foreign Relations) 84, no. 2 (March/April 2005): 53-63. 
Lin, Adela, and Janet Ong. Taiwan Predicts 29% More Chinese Tourists. June 
27, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-28/taiwan-predicts-
29-more-chinese-tourists.html (accessed September 28, 2011). 
Liu, Tao, and Xing-yi Zhang. "Ratio of males to females in China." British Medical 
Journal. April 9, 2009. 
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/338/apr09_2/b483 (accessed April 22, 
2011). 
Mazur, Allan and Joel Michalek. “Marriage, Divorce, and Male Testosterone.” 
Social Forces 77. (September 1998): 315-330  
Meng, Ren. “Confronting Three Populations of 80 Million.” Inside China Mainland 
19 (January 1997): 78-81. 
Ministry of Community Development, Youth, and Sports. Child Development Co-
Savings (Baby Bonus) Scheme. June 15, 2011. 
https://www.babybonus.gov.sg/bbss/html/index.html (accessed August 17, 
2011). 
Morally justifiable? China's opposition to Japan's bid for a permanent UNSC seat. 
May 11, 2011. http://www.artofthepossible-
cambridge.com/index.php?a=12&title=1305064036.html (accessed 
August 7, 2011).  
Ong, Janet. Taiwan Pro-Independence Party Protests China Policies in Rally. 
October 25, 2008. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=avk5M6TBg
Rrs&refer=asia (accessed September 14, 2011). 
Pomfret, John. "U.S. sells weapons to Taiwan, angering China." The Washington 
Post. January 30, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/30/AR2010013000508.html (accessed 
September 14, 2011). 
Poston Jr., Dudley L. "Son Preference and Fertility in China." Journal of Biosocial 
Science 34 (2002): 333-347. 
 56 
Rosenfeld, Michael J. "Celebration, Politics, Selective Looting and Riots: A Micro 
Level Study of the Bulls Riot of 1992 in Chicago." Social Problems 44, no. 
4 (November 1997): 483-502. 
Saunders, Phillip K. "Long-term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: Implications 
for U.S. Taiwan Policy." Asian Survey (University of California Press) 45, 
no. 6 (November/December 2005): 970-991. 
Schmetzer, Uli. China Unable To Cover Up Killings. April 21, 1994. 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-04-
21/news/9404210283_1_taiwanese-chinese-massacre (accessed 
September 28, 2011). 
Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau. Shanghai Makes Public Statistics on Marriage and  
Divorce Registrations in 2010. February 9, 2011. 
http://www.shmzj.gov.cn/gb/shmzj/node896/node898/node904/userobject
1ai27644.html (accessed November 23, 2011). 
 
Sutter, Karen M. "Business Dynamism across the Taiwan Strait: The Implications 
for Cross-Strait Relations." Asian Survey (University of California Press) 
42, no. 3 (May/June 2002): 522-540. 
Swaine, Michael D. "Trouble in Taiwan." Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 
2004): 39-49. 
Tabuchi, Hiroko. Japan Calls on China to Resume Rare Earth Exports. October 
24, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/25/business/global/25rare.html 
(accessed August 2, 2011). 
Takahashi, Kosuke. China scholars enter Okinawa fray. October 23, 2010. 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LJ23Dh01.html (accessed August 2, 
2011). 
Tanner, Murray Scot. "China rethinks unrest." The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 
3 (2004): 137-156. 
Tar, Jaroslav. "Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial 
Conflict." The Journal of Politics 72, no. 2 (2010): 413-425. 
Tempest, Rone. Boat Fire That Killed 24 Taiwan Tourists Strains China Relations 
: Incident embarrasses Beijing by spotlighting mounting insecurity in the 
countryside. April 16, 1994. http://articles.latimes.com/1994-04-
16/news/mn-46491_1_taiwan-tourists (accessed September 28, 2011). 
 57 
Thapa, Rajesh B., and et al. "Sea navigation, challenges and potentials in South 
East Asia: an assessment of suitable sites for a shipping canal in the 
South Thai Isthmus." GeoJournal 70, no. 2-3 (April 2008): 161-172. 
The Economist. "Taiwan's commonsense consensus." The Economist. February 
24, 2011. 
http://www.economist.com/node/18229208?story_id=18229208&CFID=16
4240734&CFTOKEN=98834750 (accessed April 22, 2011). 
The Economist. "The Worldwide War On Baby Girls." The Economist, March 6-
12, 2010: 77-80. 
———. The flight from marriage. August 20, 2011. 
http://www.economist.com/node/21526329 (accessed September 29, 
2011). 
The Japan Times. 'Cooperation,' Not Compensation - China to get funds for 
poison gas leak. October 17, 2003. http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20031017a5.html (accessed August 1, 2011). 
Tolis, G., D. Ackman, and et al. "Tumor growth inhibition in patients with prostatic 
carcinoma treated with luteinizing hormone-releasing hormone agonists." 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 79 (March 1982): 1658-
1662. 
Tsang, Steve. "Drivers Behind the Use of Force." In If China Attacks Taiwan: 
Military, strategy, politics and economics, edited by Steve Tsang, 1-14. 
New York: Routledge, 2006. 
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 
Tyson, Ann Scott. Navy Sends Destroyer to Protect Surveillance Ship After 
Incident in South China Sea. March 13, 2009. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/12/AR2009031203264.html (accessed August 
7, 2011). 
United Nations Children's Fund. Annual number of births (Births). July 14, 2010. 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SOWC&f=inID percent3A75 (accessed 
August 15, 2011). 
 58 
Wang, T. Y., and I-Chou Liu. "Contending Identities in Taiwan: Implications for 
Cross-Strait Relations." Asian Survey (University of California Press) 44, 
no. 4 (July/August 2004): 568-590. 
Wilson, Margo and Martin Daly. “Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence: 
The Young Male Syndrome.” Ethology and Sociobiology 6 (1985): 59-73. 
World Prison Brief - China. October 9, 2011. 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country=91 
(accessed October 9, 2011). 
Wu, Tian-Yi, and et al. "Who Should Not Go High: Chronic Disease and Work at 
Altitude During Construction of the Qinghai-Tibet Railroad." High Altitude 
Medicine and Biology 8, no. 2 (June 2007): 88-107. 
Yang, Wen Shan, and Ying-ying Tiffany Liu. "Gender Imbalances and the 
Twisted Marriage Market in Taiwan." Paper presented at the CEPED-
CICRED-INED Seminar on Female Deficit in Asia: Trends and 
Prespectives, Singapore, December 5-7, 2005.  
Zeng, Yi, Ping Tu, Baochang Gu, Yi Xu, Bohua Li, and Yongping Li. "Causes and 
Implications of the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio at Birth in 
China." Population and Development Review 19, no. 2 (June 1993): 283-
302. 
Zhu, Wei Xing, Lu Li, and Therese Hesketh. "China's excess males, sex selective 
abortion, and one child policy: analysis of data from 2005 national 
intercensus survey." British Medical Journal. April 9, 2009. 
doi:10.1136/bmj.b1211 (accessed April 22, 2011). 
 59 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
